HRS 1:2026 — Annex F forms
F-F1 … F-F4 — Fee model
Public consultation draft — draft v0.1 — issued 2026-09-07
This is a consultation draft, not an operative standard
The scheme described here is not yet certifying. No certificates have been issued and the Approved Supplier Register is not yet populated. Nothing in this document may be relied on as evidence of certification.
It is published for comment before it is finalised, because a certification standard that cannot be read by the people it governs is not a standard. Clause 12.2 commits us to publishing it; we would rather publish it early and be corrected.
Comments are invited until 2 November 2026. See How to respond. Passages marked ⚖️ are open questions on which we are specifically seeking views. Passages marked 📋 will be reconciled against OIC/SMIIC standards before issue.
This document is a scheme design. It is not a fatwa and does not purport to state Islamic law; questions of Shari'ah are for our Shari'ah Committee, whose rulings will be published with their reasoning.
Fee levels are not yet set. The structure, the method of calculation, and the constraints we place on ourselves are published here; the figures will be published in full before certification opens (clause 12.2). Blanks below are form fields, not omissions.
F-F1 — How fees are calculated
Published so that anyone can see fees are derived from measured cost rather than from what the market will bear.
Method
cost_per_audit_day = (loaded auditor day rate + travel) / utilisation
band_cost = auditor-days x cost_per_audit_day + report and decision time
overhead_per_client = fixed annual costs / number of certified clients
fee = band_cost + overhead_per_client + margin
Fixed annual costs include: register hosting and maintenance, Shari'ah and Technical Committee honoraria, accreditation against OIC/SMIIC 2:2019, trademark and legal, insurance, standards purchase, and administration.
Auditor-days per band will be measured, not assumed — from pilot audits, and reviewed after the first twenty. Class B is measured separately, because Annex A sections 6 and 7 add real audit time.
Two things this calculation may not do
- It may not reduce the audit schedule. Two audits per year, one unannounced, is fixed by clause 10.2 and is not an adjustable input.
- It may not be resolved by private discount. Where the arithmetic produces a fee that is not viable at low client numbers, the answer is a published launch programme open to all — never an individually negotiated rate (F4.5).
Review
Annually, and after the first twenty audits. Published on change.
F-F2 — Published fee schedule
In preparation. Fee levels will be published in full before certification opens, together with the size bands, the Class B differential, and any launch programme terms. Clause 12.2 requires it, and F4.5 prohibits private discounts: any deviation from the published schedule will itself be published as a named, time-limited programme open to all applicants.
F-F3 — Launch cohort programme terms
Published, named, time-limited, open to all — the only way a launch discount is compatible with F4.5.
| Term | Value |
|---|---|
| Programme name | ___ |
| Open from / to | ___ — a fixed date, not "until we decide" |
| Places | first ___ establishments meeting the criteria |
| Eligibility | any establishment in Azerbaijan meeting HRS 1; no invitation, no discretion |
| Discount | ___% of the annual fee for the first ___ months |
| Not discounted | the audit schedule. Two audits a year, one unannounced, unchanged |
| Standard applied | HRS 1 in full. No relaxation of any requirement |
| After the period | standard published fees, notified ___ months in advance |
| Publication | terms, and the list of participants, public |
The temptation at launch is to make the standard easier for early adopters so the register fills. That is how a scheme's first cohort becomes its permanent credibility problem — those certificates stay in the market for years. Discount the fee; never the requirements or the visits.
F-F4 — Revenue concentration monitoring report
To the Technical Committee, quarterly. Implements F4.1.
Report
| Metric | This quarter | Rolling 12m | Limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total certification revenue | — | ||
| Largest single client — % of revenue | 15% proposed — see F4.1 | ||
| Top 3 clients combined — % | ___% | ||
| Largest group (related entities) — % | ___% | ||
| Revenue from suppliers vs. establishments | — | ||
| Clients where revenue rose >50% YoY | flag |
Related-party check
| Client | Related entities | Combined % | Common ownership identified? |
|---|
Concentration is usually discovered through group structures, not single names. A hotel group, its central kitchen, and its three restaurants are one commercial relationship and one point of leverage, however many certificates they hold.
On breach
- Disclosed to the Technical Committee at the next meeting — not deferred
- Written reduction plan with dates
- Recorded in the annual transparency report (Annex G, G3.5)
- Until resolved: any adverse decision affecting that client is taken by the Technical Committee, not by management
Launch derogation
Concentration limits are structurally impossible with few clients. Set an explicit derogation with an end date, publish it, and hold to the date.
| Derogation until | ___ |
| Interim limit | ___% |
| Published at | ___ |
Point 4 is the actual control. The limit is a signal; moving the decision away from the people who feel the commercial pressure is the protection. A certifier that cannot afford to fail its biggest client will not fail its biggest client — and that is rarely corruption, usually just arithmetic.